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 HALDANE‟S MACKINDERGARTEN :  A  RADICAL EXPERIMENT IN 
BRITISH MILITARY EDUCATION? 
 
 
The name of Sir Halford Mackinder(1861-1947)  today is associated with a form of 
theorising about international relations called Geopolitics
1
. It can be described as an 
attempt to apply synthesis to geography, history and international politics. He 
developed “outlook”which had three important qualities: an ability to interpret the 
past; to visualize the present ; and to imagine the future. Despite this formidable 
intellectual legacy some geographers, who are advocates of critical geopolitics, have 
wrongly interpreted both Mackinder and his ideas
2
 as being simply the handmaiden of 
Western imperialism: ”The British political geographer Halford Mackinder (1904) 
also argued that the ending of the nineteenth century would bring forth a different 
type of political and economic world. International politics would hence forth be 
operating in a closed world system because among other things, European colonialism 
and imperialism would encompass the entire earth‟s surface.”3  
 
This interpretation ignores an important aspect about Mackinder‟s career. He was that 
rare beast in British public life - a polymath. His career was as diverse as it was 
breath- taking. It could have constituted the careers of at least five men, not one. It 
included serving as the Conservative MP for the Camlachie Division of Glasgow 
(1910-1922), Chairman of the Imperial Shipping Committee (1920-1939), and British 
High Commissioner to South Russia.(1919-1920). He was also the first Principal of 
the University of Reading (1892-1903), Director of the London School of Economics 
(1903-1908), and founder of the School of Geography at Oxford University in 
1899.Mackinder himself  recognised that his career had not been one of linear 
progression: ”There has been another kind of career I will describe as erratic and such 
a career has been mine, a long succession of adventures and resignations. I do not 
admit to having been a rolling stone, because I have generally known where I was 
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going –but I have certainly gathered no moss”.4 The aim of this article is to evaluate a 
dimension of this polymath career that has to date received only sparse and 
intermittent attention. Furthermore, it will be shown that it has been obscured by a 
combination of vague and inaccurate information. This lack of facts has been fused 
with an interpretation that has had the effect of distancing one of Mackinder‟s 
institutions-the London School of Economics- from any association with what was 
one of the most radical experiments in British military education during the twentieth 
century namely the “ Mackindergarten”. This was the nickname given to it by the 
LSE student magazine, The Clare Market Review
5
. Its official title was the Class for 
the Administrative Training of Army Officers. 
 
The basic parameters of this course in military education are worth stating. The first 
class commenced in January 1907 at the LSE. The course lasted for approximately six 
months. It did not confer a degree or a diploma. Instead those army officers who 
passed were entitled to have the letter E (examination) placed after their names in the 
Army List. They also received a certificate from the LSE. Finally, each class was 
given a class photograph. In terms of overall numbers , between 1907 and 1914,there 
were approximately 31 officers appointed to attend this course. The majority were 
from the Army Service Corps, although the infantry and other corps were represented 
There were also a small number of officers from the Indian Army. A brief analysis of 
the composition of the course will be given later.             
 
To evaluate this course a four- fold approach will be taken. First, there is a need to 
establish the historical facts. Secondly, the unique circumstances in which the course 
was conceived, and the wider political and social ideas in which it was embedded, 
will be explained. This will also entail assessing the personal relationships that 
Mackinder was able to draw upon to make the course the success that it was. Thirdly, 
to address the question about the radical nature of the “Mackindergarten”, it is 
important to identify the generic qualities of military education. This will be done by 
posing the following questions: What are the causes of innovation in military 
education? .Why in Britain was its development and progress erratic, and  its utility 
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sometimes contested? . Why was the distinction between the two branches of the 
British army‟s staff: operations and intelligence on the one hand and administration 
on the other so important ? Is military education, to paraphrase Hegel, like the truth, 
inherently dynamic, Is it that the truism of one generation does not hold for another? 
Finally, an evaluation of the success achieved in sustaining the course‟s aims, and  as 
far as the available evidence will allow, the effectiveness of the knowledge transfer to 
the tactical and operational military environment will be undertaken The syllabus and 
exam questions of the geographical part of the course will be used to provide a means 
to assess  the radical nature of Mackinder‟s course. Finally, an evaluation will be 
made concerning the reasons for the demise of the course.  
 
In terms of the historical facts, the path is littered with inaccurate and vague 
information .One of Mackinder‟s two biographers, Parker, maintains that the course 
ran for seven years and was for senior officers only : ”In 1906 Mackinder was asked 
by Haldane ,now Secretary of State for War, to organise at the LSE, a course for 
senior army officers–which came to be known as “Haldane‟s  Mackindergarten”; it 
was held annually until 1914”.6In fact the bulk of the officers attending were captains 
and majors with a few colonels. The student cohort of this course could not be 
described as senior officers. Mackinder‟s other biographer, Blouet, while identifying 
the parentage of the course and the date of commencement accurately, is vague as to 
when it was ended.: ”Haldane (Minister of War) and Mackinder worked out a scheme 
to give Army officers administrative training. The first groups of officers entered the 
School in January 1907and completed a six month course in which they were exposed 
to accounting, law, economic theory, geography, statistics ,and transport studies. The 
program was a success and continued for many years.”7 It is only in the official  
history of the LSE that accurate historical facts are given in terms of the longevity of 
the course .What is curious about this account is that Dahrendorf attempts to distance 
the LSE from the course completely, and Mackinder‟s role is not commented upon or 
assessed:  ” Strictly speaking it was not the School that made the experiment but 
R.B.Haldane, who had become Secretary of State for War in the 1906 Liberal 
Government and who released some thirty military officers for “ a course of 
instruction in preparation for administrative duties”. They were soon known as 
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“Haldane‟s Mackindergarten”. The LSE Army Class was interrupted by the First 
World War but was soon reinstated in 1924 and it continued until 1932”.8 
 
 
It is very clear from a War Office communiqué issued on the 10th December 1906 
that Mackinder was in charge of the project.: ”In  conformity with the decision 
already announced, it is now notified that it has been arranged by the Army Council 
that a Special Experimental Course of Commerical and Business Training for officers 
shall be commenced at the London School of Economics under Mr Mackinder the 
Director of the School on the 10
th
 Jan 1907”.9.Furthermore, Dahrendorf omits any 
reference to the reports produced by what was called the Advisory Board, London 
School of Economics. This consisted of twelve members, both military and civilian 
who produced, between 1907 and 1914, an annual  report for the War Office. This 
report always contained an assessment of the academic attainment of the officers on 
the course, and information on changes in the syllabus. In the first report the key role 
played by Mackinder is clearly acknowledged: ”We desire to acknowledge the 
invaluable services of Mr Mackinder himself in connection with the work which has 
been done. His unflagging zeal, and the energy and discretion with which he has 
organized and carried out a scheme which was entirely original and in several ways 
full of difficulties all of which have been successfully overcome, deserve the highest 
praise”.10.            
 
. It was Lenin who argued that “war is the great locomotive force of change”. If there 
was one conflict that can be cited as the source of the change that brought the 
Mackindergarten into existence it was the Boer War (1899 to 1902). A Royal 
Commission
11
 set up to examine the problems that the war had brought to light. It 
underlined what the critics had pointed out: poor staff work, outdated weapons, and a 
lack of tactical skill, and an absence of a coherent doctrine. Yet in one important 
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sense this commission was incomplete.: ”The majority report recited many of the 
Army‟s known deficiencies, but it did not outline a plan for remedying them.”12. 
 
One key area that impeded the British war effort in South Africa had been the 
dysfunctional relationship between military operations and administration. This was 
underlined by Major General Douglas Haig in an exchange that took place at a 
General Staff Conference January 1908. Referring to the South African War, and the 
conflation of operations and administration that had taken place, Haig pressed home 
the need for the army to adopt Field Service Regulations Part 2. This would produce a 
uniform framework for military administration : ”Retorting in his brusque and 
uncompromising manner, Haig reminded delegates of the South African War where 
three different systems (of administration) were adopted concurrently by three 
different headquarters. A more systematic approach, he implied, was essential in large 
wars, hence the need for a book of regulations produced by the War Staffs”13.  
 
On 1 January 1906  Haldane, newly appointed to the office of Secretary of State for 
War, produced a memorandum which set out the rudimentary ideas upon which the 
regular and auxiliary forces of the army were to be organised in future A second 
memorandum  was produced on 1 February. However, the first memorandum outlined 
the policy objectives that underlined a need for the course that Mackinder was to 
develop: ”In the first memorandum, Haldane specified the principles which would 
underpin the reform of the regular army. He contended that the army would have to 
differ from that of any other nation in order to meet its unique, long distance, overseas 
commitments. He affirmed that the country needed a highly organised and well-
equipped striking force which can be transported, with the least possible delay, to any 
part of the world where it is required”14. 
 
There is no doubt that this was an ambitious objective. To project and sustain military 
power at a distance without an established basing structure presented a serious 
challenge for Haldane‟s policy objectives. One of the solutions he adopted could be 
described as a “continental solution” as it took its inspiration from European armies. 
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The key means of overcoming the challenge of power projection was the deliberate 
separation of military administration and military operations: “Haldane had 
endeavoured to overcome those difficulties by separating the work of the General 
Staff from purely administrative duties, and by organising the force on a war and not 
on a peace basis. Having seen  those principles operating effectively within the 
German Army in September 1906, Haldane had determined to implement them in 
Britain.”15  
 
Despite this assertion by Spiers there is evidence to suggest a more complex path of 
influence that has its origins in the British army of the early nineteenth century . This 
evidence was provided in 1922 by Haldane himself. Speaking during the discussion of 
a lecture given at the  Royal United Services Institute. He said :” I remember well in 
1906,when General Ellison and I were in Berlin studying the organisation of the 
German Army in those easy going days, after we had been struck, and expressed 
ourselves struck with the extraordinary perfection and distinctiveness to which the 
principle of separation of the two phases had been carried, and with the way in which 
it worked out in practice. I remember an eminent German general smiling and saying: 
You would be less surprised if you knew that we had only borrowed that lesson. Our 
great Moltke was a student of your Duke of Wellington and he based his great 
military plans of organisation largely on the practical work which your Duke of 
Wellington carried out in the Peninsular campaign and at other times.”16 
 
It is also important to address the question as to why the British army, in the process 
of creating a General Staff in 1906, created two distinct routes for the education and 
the training of its staff officers: Camberley and the Mackindergarten. 
There are three points that go some way to offering an explanation. The first aspect  
has been convincingly articulated  by Strachan .It was a product of the geostrategic 
realities of the British empire, and the need to mount various expeditions in disparate  
locations: ”Planning for these colonial  contingencies was not primarily a function of 
operational thought .The tasks were administrative and logistical ; the issues were 
medical, cartographical, and calorific. Thus, as an imperial power, Britain needed a 
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staff which put as much weight on administration as on command..”17 The second 
aspect was that the British General Staff, when it was created, was not a mirror image 
of the German General Staff .It was not able nor designed to provide intellectual 
leadership and coherence that the latter was capable of doing. Finally, in terms of 
operational planning it was not a dominant institution like its German counterpart. It 
had to negotiate and deal with the army organisation for manpower: the Adjutant 
General ,and the army organisation for logistics: the Quartermaster General. In terms 
of the conduct of operations this presented British commanders with a unique 
challenge: ”The field commander therefore had a dual function: the conduct of 




To put these aspects in a broader context Spiers has argued, in keeping with 
Haldane‟s original conception, that the BEF was not designed exclusively as a force 
that would fight on the European continent. It could be deployed anywhere in the 
world, up until 1907 its the potential opponent was more likely to be the Russian army 
in Asia than the German army in Europe. It has also been interpreted as tackling 
another problem: ”It was a solution to a long standing dilemma: the pressure to scatter 
British regular forces around the empire in penny packets as opposed to the need to 
create a central strategic reserve”19                                                               
 
It was not until 1909 that two important documents were  published that gave 
doctrinal expression to the policy objectives that Haldane was trying to reach. The 
first one was Field Service Regulations Part 1(operations) and the second one was 
Field Service Regulations Part 2 (administration).Interestingly the latter had existed in 
draft form since 1903, but it had taken the impetus provided by a new administration 
to overcome the resistance of a number of Departments of the War Office who had 
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It can be suggested that the armed forces of a particular country are often a product of 
the society that produces them. At any one time they reflect, like a time capsule, the 
values, beliefs and social order of the societies from which they spring. This is only 
part of the equation. A more nuanced analysis would also claim that the armed forces 
of any state work in a social environment. Furthermore, the armed forces can face 
indifference or outright hostility to the wars they fight and the activities they 
undertake. Yet as Michael Howard has argued the support that they receive from the 
society that has produced them can affect them as an organisation : “The less support 
which the Armed Forces get from their environment- intellectual, psychological, 
economic and personal support-the less efficient they are likely to be, or the harder it 
is for them to remain efficient ;and the greater is the danger that they will harden into 
an inbred, inward-looking group fundamentally at odds with their 
surroundings”21.The prevailing social environment of the early twentieth century was 
to have its impact on the origins of Mackinder‟s course.  
 
One of the remarkable things about the Mackindergarten was that it had its first 
students enrolled exactly one year from Haldane coming into office. This rapid  
development and  subsequent attempt to increase the power and efficiency of the 
army was drawn from the leading edge of a social and political movement in which 
both Mackinder and Haldane were actively involved. It was called the  National 
Efficiency movement. Its origins can be traced to a speech by Lord Rosebery, a 
former Liberal Prime Minister, in 1901 increasingly aware of the institutional and 
societal weaknesses exposed by the Boer War Rosebery, spoke of his intention to 
organise a new party which had “national efficiency” as its objective. A year later in 
March 1902 he defined the it in the following way :”A condition of national fitness 
equal to the demands of our empire-administrative, parliamentary, commercial 
educational, physical, moral, naval, and military fitness–so that we should make the 
best of our admirable raw material”.22The political objectives of this new political 
movement were two fold: first the desire for social reform; secondly, the 
strengthening of Britain‟s military and naval capabilities. Rosebery‟s ideas found 
common cause with some unlikely political allies, for example the Fabian socialism 
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of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. The Fabian Society was focused on social reform and 
promoting the concept of the British Empire. This aim was articulated by one of their 
members the Irish Protestant playwright George Bernard Shaw. In 1900 he argued 
that the Fabians should be concerned with: ”the effective social organisation of the 
whole Empire and its rescue from the strife of classes and private interest”.23 
 
The Webbs were instigators and founders of an institution that originally was intended 
to be the brains trust of this new political movement of national efficiency. In reality it 
existed as a dining club, albeit one with a remarkable membership list. The name of 
the institution was the Co-Efficients
24
.The first meeting was held on  8 December 
1902.The pertinent point is that both Haldane and Mackinder were among the original 
twelve members. Each member was to be an expert in a special field of knowledge. 
Haldane was the expert in Law and Mackinder was the expert in Liberal Imperialism. 
Other prominent members  were Sir Edward Grey, Bertrand Russell, Leo Amery, 
George Bernard Shaw, Sidney Webb, and H.G.Wells
25
.Later members included the 
maritime strategist  Sir Julian Corbett and the poet Henry Newbolt. These twelve 
original members, plus the later additions, constituted what today would have been 
described as the think tank of a new social imperial party. Mackinder and Haldane 
would have met on a regular basis between 1902 and 1908. Tensions over Joseph 
Chamberlain‟s Tariff Reform campaign led to the dining club being dissolved in 
1910. It is this connection that  partially explains the remarkable speed with which the 
LSE‟s Army Course was conceived and developed. 
It can be argued that dining clubs in this period of British social and political history 
were often used as a mechanism of policy development: ”Throughout his career 
Haldane used the dinner party, lubricated by superb cooking and choice wines, and 
much admired cigars as an instrument for discussing, refining and influencing 
political policies”.26 This political and intellectual support, that was so important for 
the fast development of this course, was also facilitated by the institutional 
connections that both Haldane and Rosebery had with the LSE.: ”Haldane became a 
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member of the court of Governors, and in 1901  the Earl of Rosebery became 
president of the School”27. 
 
Was the “Mackindergarten”  really a radical experiment? In terms of educating and   
training its officers for staff duties, the British army had set up a Staff College at 
Camberley in 1858.This had been a direct consequence of the uncomfortable facts 
that had emerged from the Crimean War (1854-56).If not a product of defeat it was 
certainly the child of a lamentable performance. ”Four Committees of inquiry, several 
Parliamentary debates and a flood of correspondence and memoranda testify that the 
concern for an improvement in military education –particularly of the staff –on the 
part of politicians and soldiers was both deep and widespread.”28 The challenge was 
the lack of synthesis between the normative aspirations that were set by the entrance 
exam and the syllabus and the anti-intellectualism that existed in the bulk of 
regiments that made up the mid-Victorian British Army. This was an army that did 
not abolish the purchase scheme for commissions until 1871.The first Commandant of 
the Staff College was Major General Sir Patrick MacDougall.(1858 -1861).His tenure 
has been summarised in the following manner: ”His main task, however, was to 
implement the recommendations of the Council of Military Education and to set the 
new institutions on its feet”29.  There was no focus on developing what could be 
described as higher-level critical thinking skills. Instead education or more 
specifically, at this time, military history, had a number of specific functions to 
perform. MacDougall argued that : ”it is of little importance to the state that the man 
who leads his regiment bravely should be a good classical scholar or a good historian. 
What was essential in his view was that the officer should be versed in military 
history, that he should be able to direct his men in strengthening a post by field-
works, that he should have a good eye for ground, and that he should be able to speak 
other languages than his own. He recommended that all officers be required to attend 
a central military school for  a least six or eight months before appointment to a 
regiment, and if  specialized education were necessary for certain positions then he 
urged the establishment of a separate branch of the staff composed of scientific men, 
as in the French Army. Even the United States had undertaken to give all officers a 
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scientific education; only in England did the professional education of officers remain 
entirely voluntary”.30 This laissez faire attitude, that often left too much power in the 
hands of regimental officers, was to affect the British army‟s approach to  military 
education throughout the twentieth century. 
 
If the early period of the British army‟s approach to military education was that it was 
a narrowly focused activity that was done on a voluntary basis. It was only at the end 
of the nineteenth century that things began to change. Major General Hildyard, who 
became the Commandant at Camberley in 1893, began to develop an approach that 
emphasized solving  problems of strategy, tactics and organisation. The assessment 
and evaluation done through a series of  practical tests. The subject matter that was to 
be the focus of  Mackinder‟s course, organisation and administration was still an 
intregal part of  the syllabus of the Staff College. While this approach was not about 
the development of critical thinking skills, the aim was to train the judgement of 
officers, so that they would make the right decisions in the uncertainty and confusion 
of battle:   ”It is to Hildyard‟s credit that he transformed the College into a mental 
gymnasium for the Army just at a time when the future leaders of the First World War 
era were passing through.”31   One of the ways he did this was through the intelligent 
study of military history, facilitated by officers such as Colonel Henderson who was a 
member of the directing staff of the Staff College between 1890 and 1899. To 
Henderson success in any battle was dependent on knowing when to disregard the 
rules of war and to subordinate the theory to the challenges of the moment and be  
creative.
32
Yet the emphasis was still on military history. Henderson argued this point 
in 1893:”No doubt it would be simpler by far to lay down a normal formation and to 
practise nothing else .But when we turn to military history, and fail to discover a 
single battle in which the initial formations of the infantry have not had to be very 
greatly modified ,we may be permitted to believe that a system which accustoms 
officers and men to constant modifications of formations, compels them to use their 
own judgement, and brings peace-training and battle-practice into line is a thoroughly 
sound one”.33  
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 Ironically it was Brigadier Henry Wilson,
34
Commandant of the Staff College from 
1906 to 1910 who was to be one of the most strident critics of the Mackindergarten:   
”Wilson opposed the course on the grounds that it might do an infinity of harm to the 
SC(staff college),and determined to fight it for all he was worth. Neither NG nor 
Hutch
35
,he wrote, ”have the slightest idea what Mackinder‟s school may mean ,but 
Miles
36
sees clearly enough that it may lead to a rival on the S.C. and complete 
separation of the Administrative and General Staff. He proposed to attend as many 
lectures as possible so as to be in the best position to fight the game if necessary”37 
Wilson had a point as Mackinder‟s vision for the course went beyond mere 
professional education: ”We have in this course to do something more than merely 
teach and learn; we have to evolve a tradition. As the officers who have passed 
through this course increase in the future from 30 to 40 to several hundred ,as they 
rise in the Service and gradually man the Departments of Quarter-Master-General and 
the Master-General of the Ordnance, they must carry an administration tradition with 
them similar ,mutatis mutandis
38
, to the tradition of the graduates from the Staff 
College.”39         
It is intended to evaluate this course and the army‟s reaction to it. This will be done by  
examining the reports that were produced by the Advisory Board, London School of 
Economics.
40
Before doing this it is important to understand what made the  
Mackindergarten so different in terms of its approach.    
 The radical nature of the course that Mackinder launched at the LSE in 1907 can be  
understood by its intellectual departure points. Military history was dispensed with, 
and replaced with what Mackinder called “special ideas”41. The first of these ideas 
was the assumption that the British army was the greatest single business in the 
United Kingdom. He claimed that it even outstripped one of the leading railway 
companies of the time, the London and North Western Railway which had, in 1907, 
receipts of £15 million per year. He then went on to argue that both the Army Council 
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and the Lords of the Admiralty were in fact two boards of business directors, the 
difference between the two being that the army transacted its business in India and 
throughout the empire. Thus the geographical scope over which it has to operate was 
greater than the Royal Navy. However, Mackinder had carefully qualified this point 
and made a series of nuanced observations that recognised a difference of function 
and principle, but interestingly a similarity in methods, as far as military 
administration was concerned: ”The Army is undoubtedly the greatest single business 
concern in the country. It is true of course that it is necessarily conducted on a 
different principle from ordinary city business. The Army is not conducted for profit, 
but to produce power. This power is used in peace time in order to maintain peace and 
in war time to achieve victory. But although this distinction of profit and power is a 
real one, yet I do not think that it makes a very vital difference as regards methods. 
Your aim in the Army must be to produce the necessary amount of power at the least 
possible cost, and one of the main elements in a city business tending to produce 
profits is the saving of working expenses”.42  
 
The second of Mackinder‟s special ideas, was one with which he was closely 
identified with in a political sense - efficiency
43
.As far as the Army was concerned,  
he argued that the idea had to rest on the twin pillars of knowledge and imagination. 
In turn these two concepts were used to link the course to one of the core functions of 
strategy, identifying the most suitable means to achieve your objectives: “A great 
artist, who with a few strokes produces a telling portrait, is characterised by the two 
powers of being able to see the truth, and then of being able to reproduce it with 
economy of effort.. The same is true in the realm of strategy .What you admire in the 
achievement of the General in the field is the power of seeing the situation ,so far as it 
is discernible in the fog of war, and then the power of changing that situation by the 
simplest possible means.”44 Given that this course had been created with the specific 
purpose of creating a separate administrative staff for the Army, and was fully funded 
by the War Office,
45
 Mackinder developed this idea further by linking back to his first 
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idea of the Army as being like a business in certain methods and procedures :”Your 
great business man is as truly an artist as the great painter, or the great general. He has 
learned by apprenticeship to see the truth, and also by experience to accomplish his 
objects by simple means. The result is that he acts apparently without effort .The same 
is true of the business of war. And in this connection I venture to remind you that 
Lord Kitchener owes much of his success to the fact that in addition to all his qualities 
he was an economical administrator during the Sudanese Campaigns.”46   
 
Despite this lucid articulation of his “special ideas” Mackinder‟s course had been 
subject to criticisms of various kinds. He found himself having to deal with one of the 
perennial challenges of military education: a contested utility. Furthermore, he had to 
respond to this criticism while conceding that the Mackindergarten was an 
“experiment”47. He dealt with two categories of attack: ”The first is that by far the 
best plan would be to take civilians experienced in business and to set them to 
administer the army, leaving the officers to do the fighting .In reply to this I am 
prepared to say that all history shows that the interference of civilians in military 
operations has not proved a success…….The other group of objectors urged that army 
officers should be sent for a period into a city office, there to serve as dignified office 
boys.”48 The experimental nature of the Army Class and the evolving nature of its 
syllabus were acknowledged in the initial War Office communiqué of December 
1906: ”The course which is now about to be inaugurated must be regarded as more or 
less experimental ,and the syllabus of instruction will be amended and modified as 
hereafter may be found expedient.”49   
Mackinder approached the challenge represented by these two approaches by 
embracing synthesis. The method was for army officers to understand the perspectives 
of business men. He qualified this by saying that these methods had to be interpreted 
and utilised in a particular way: “What you have to form is another special kind of 
business man, the soldier. I repeat therefore that it will be our object to teach those 
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business methods which have been approved by long and general experience ,and to 
leave you to appropriate so much of them as fits with our own business of soldier.”50  
  
Did Mackinder‟s “special ideas” did mark the inception of  a radical experiment in 
British military education? This question can only be evaluated  by an examination of 
two issues: the Geography syllabus as it evolved between 1907 and 1932;and the 
army‟s view of the course as a whole over the same period. Mackinder in his opening 
address acknowledged that the syllabuses were tentative and  not yet complete. He 
also underlined the fact that the course‟s development was going to be something of a 
departure for the LSE in that it would   require a partnership between the academic 
staff and the army officers on the course before the syllabus could be finally fixed. 
Mackinder acknowledged the nature of the problem and the pathway to a  solution: 
”Given the lecturers with their specialised knowledge of the several subjects, what 
portions of those subjects will be of the most use to you.? It can only be by practice 
and experience that we can find what those portions are. There are two principles of 
selection which must be borne in mind. In the first place we must consider the direct 
utility to the soldier of the information given, and in the second place we must 
consider the general principles underlying it.”51    
To appreciate the scope of the challenge that Mackinder faced it is worth outlining the 
extent and diverse nature of the subjects covered on the course which were: 
 
 Accountancy 
 Law  
 Economic Theory 
 Geography 
 Statistical Method 
 Transport 
In an opening address Mackinder explained the relevance of each of these subjects to 
the needs of military administration.. Mackinder was to be personally involved in 
teaching Geography to the Army Class. In the first Advisory Board report he revealed 
both the genesis of having the subject on the course and its purpose: ”The course on 
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geography has been included at the special request of the business men on the 
Consultative Committee. The object of economic geography is to enable the business  
man or the administrator in the clearest and most certain manner to grasp in his own 
mind and to convey to others the resources and conditions of a country resulting from 
its geography. We must learn to think geographically if in writing a report ,let us say, 
on the supplies and communications of a given region, we should make sure that our 
enquiry is exhaustive and that our statements are in perspective. In these days of 
world-wide communications and world prices you cannot think of any region in 
proper perspective unless you have the rest of the world in the back of your mind.”52. 
He then went onto to outline the intellectual challenge  the course faced, and which 
linked back to one of the “special ideas” of the course - efficiency  : ”We are really 
dealing with a great synthetic problem, and our object in the six months before us will 
be that all your studies should contribute to a single end, and that you should go back 
to your duties feeling that you have definitely acquired valuable knowledge ,increased 
breadth of outlook, and therefore increased power of efficiency”.53 Apart from the 
formal aspect of the syllabus Mackinder outlined the intention to set up what he called 
“smoking meetings”. These were intended to take place once a week in the evening 
after dinner. The guest speakers would be business men. The purpose of these talks 
was stated in the following way: “Thus we will accumulate the experience of practical 
men”54.           
 
The manner in which these radical ideas were sustained can be evaluated in a four –
fold approach that has been previously outlined.
55
This will include examining the 
Advisory Reports that were made on the course between 1907 and 1914 and secondly 
by evaluating the part of the syllabus that Mackinder both taught and examined –
Geography; finally, by  understanding how the syllabus was amended and modified 
between 1907 and 1932.  
The Advisory Board which provided oversight for the War Office, and produced a 
series of annual reports 
56
. In the first report it is clear the army regarded the course as 
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having been a success, and the syllabus effective, but some adjustments would be 
made: ”In conclusion we desire to say that we are convinced that the results which 
have been achieved by this first class fully warrant the continuance of this experiment. 
The experience which has now been gained does not make it necessary to reorganize 
the scheme in any essential respects.”57 In terms of the numbers and background of 
the officers, the first course contained  31 students, and the largest contingent 
consisted of twelve from the Army Service Corps
58
. 
          The first Advisory Board report also confirmed that the challenge of pedagogy 
had been successfully addressed : ”It is to be noted that many of the questions (on the 
exam papers) show that the lecturers have gradually adapted themselves to Army 
requirements. Mr Mackinder writes: ”In this matter the officers have also assisted in 
no small degree, and the friendly relations which have subsisted between the teaching 
staff and the officers justify me in regarding them as collaborators in what ,when at 
first faced ,appeared to be very difficult problems. It was necessary to teach the 
fundamental principles of several subjects , and yet so to teach them that in the utmost 
possible degree the treatment should be practical and pertinent to military 
requirements. We think that this has been done with considerable success.”59 
 
Appendix B of the Advisory Board‟s report for 1907 contained the syllabus for  the 
course as a whole. With respect to Geography there was a dichotomy of approach . 
One element had what could be described as a regional study. The second element 
was an interpretation of geography as a theatre of military operations. When this 
perspective is utilised certain important changes take place. Geography becomes more 
abstract and simplified in terms of the way that it is interpreted. Furthermore, the 
military strategist or commander will perceive only those geographical features that 
are relevant to the military objectives that he is attempting to achieve. This view of 
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geography has a long lineage that goes back to antiquity.
60
 The region that was 
selected was India. At the beginning of the twentieth century this was of vital 
geostrategic importance for Britain.: ”The course will be divided into two  parts. The 
first part will be devoted to a careful study of India. As  an example of the methods of 
inquiry into the resources and conditions of a region of the world.”.61 The other five 
parts of the course were presented in a similar manner
62
.   
 
The second element of the geography course was intended to ”deal more generally 
with the geographical circumstances of those states with which this country is most 
likely to be concerned either as an opponent or an ally”.63 The subsequent exam 
questions revealed a close congruence with the geostrategic and geopolitical ideas that 
Mackinder developed in his book: Britain and the British Seas which had been 
published in 1902
64
.Furthermore, it was one of the core text books for the Geography 
section of the course.
65
. The book made a series of geostrategic evaluations  about the 
nature of the relationship between geography, the defence of Britain, and what today 
is called the exercise of sea control and sea denial, although Mackinder called it 
command of the sea.: ”The defence of Britain resolves itself into three problems: (1) 
the retention of  command of the sea ,or rather of the power of taking that command 
should the occasion demand it.(2) the defence of Great Britain should command of the 
sea be temporarily lost.(3) the separate defence of Ireland in the same contingency, 
for under such conditions the prompt and certain reinforcement of the army in Ireland 
would not be practicable”.66 
One of the questions that Mackinder set for this first Army class was embedded in this 
perspective :”Britain is at war with a naval power which has succeeded in throwing a 
certain force into the West of Ireland, and has raised a great rebellion in that country. 
The fighting at sea has been indecisive, and the enemy is getting ships through with 
arms and ammunition for the rebels. Our forces have had to fall back on the Curragh 
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and Dublin. Supplies are being brought from Great Britain only with difficulty, and  it 
is essential that the English forces should, as far as possible ,maintain themselves on 
supplies available in Ireland .Write a report on the geography of Ireland as well 
indicate the supplies and communications which would be available.”67 This question 
demonstrated a prescience that was remarkable. In April 1916 the Imperial German 
Navy attempted to land, on the south west coast of Ireland, a large cache of arms and 
ammunition to facilitate an insurgency in what was then an integral part of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
This ability to frame exam questions that had a real prescience was not restricted to 
Ireland. When the questions for geographical essays are examined with respect to the 
European continent, Mackinder appears to not only to have anticipated the advent of 
the First World War by seven years, but also to have identified the geographical 
location of the deployment of the British Expeditionary Force: ”Britain allied with the 
France is at war with Germany. The Germans have occupied Holland and are 
besieging Antwerp, so that the Scheldt is denied to Britain as a base. The German line 
extends across to Liege. The British as a left wing to the French are based in Dunkirk, 
Calais, and Boulogne. With a view to such a contingency, write a report on the 
supplies and communications of Belgium, and the French departments of the Nord 
,and the Pas de Calais”68 Although this second scenario elucidated by Mackinder    
was in many ways in keeping with the strategic scenario that had been accepted by the 
British General Staff since 1907 .It reflected the broader changes that had taken place 
in Britain‟s geostrategy in the period prior to the First World War: ”The Anglo-
French staff talks and the imposition of strategical unity by the CID in 1911 were 
more decisive in establishing what sort of war Britain would fight if she came in than 
the question of whether she was obliged to come in ;but they certainly caused many 
politicians and officials to regard intervention as being very likely.”69 In tackling 
these problems he wanted the students to focus on what he described as the “great 
synthetical problem” in order to increase their power of efficiency. Mackinder laid 
great emphasis on this in his report on the geographical section of the course: ”I 
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regard as first class those reports in which the authors show a capacity to for using 
scientific geography as a framework for the setting of practical details….the value and 
necessity of this method increases in regions where detailed information is scanty or 
lacking”70. 
 In the second course which ran from October 1907 to March 1908 ,Geography was 
subject to a series of changes. The most important was that while Geography was still 
part of the syllabus, the course requirements were reduced. What were the reasons for 
this change? The answer was provided by Mackinder in the second Advisory Board 
report.
71:”I felt that it was necessary somewhat to reduce the range of instruction, and 
with that object we did not on this occasion repeat the experiment of requiring a 
geographical report from each member of the class. It will be remembered that stress 
was laid on Geography in the first place at the special request of the Advisory Board , 
but I felt all along that it was at more pertinent to the study of Strategy than to that of 
Administration. A little of it, however, presenting aspects unfamiliar to those whose 
ideas of geography are based on the school lessons of a few years ago, appeared 
desirable”72  
In addition, to this there was no longer a final examination. No Geography paper was 
included in Appendix C of the Advisory Board report which reproduced all the 
papers.
73
 The other important change that took place with respect to the Geography 
syllabus was a change of emphasis in terms of area. The regional study of  India was 
replaced by one that had Britain as its focus The second element of the course 
remained unchanged, as did the overall teaching objectives that applied to both parts. 
Mackinder  focussed on an interpretation of Geography as a theatre of military 
operations: ”Special regard will be had to such physical facts and human activities as 
most affect military operations –for instance, tidal conditions along coasts and in 
rivers ,land forms, distribution of seasons ,water supply ,character of vegetation, 
distribution of population, labour supply, means of transport ,trade routes, and trade 
centres.”74 
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By the time of the third course, which ran from October 1908 to March 1909, the 
significance of the Mackindergarten  from the army‟s perspective underwent an 
important change. It went from being regarded by the War Office as a Special 
Experimental Course
75
 to an organisation where both the pertinence of the syllabus 
and the subsequent enhancement of the army‟s administrative efficiency were 
recognised as important its overall operational effectiveness. ”So far three classes 
have been held, and a fourth is to be arranged to begin in October next .The 
alterations made last year in the original syllabus appeared to give so much 
satisfaction that no further alterations were attempted this year…We therefore again 
strongly recommend that the course be made a permanent annual institution, in order 
to gradually to create a body of officers well fitted to undertake the varied 
administrative duties that may fall upon them”.76  
It was during this third course that Mackinder‟s direct responsibility for the course 
came to an end. In 1908 he resigned from the Directorship of the LSE to facilitate his 
election  as a MP in January 1910. The Advisory Board in their 1909 report fully 
acknowledged the pivotal role he had played since its inception in 1906: “We learnt 
with deep regret of Mr Mackinder‟s resignation of the Directorship of the School. The 
scheme of training owes much to him, both in general outline and in elaboration in 
detail, and we are sorry that the course could not have been firmly established as a 
permanent one while he was in charge of it.”77 Despite his departure from the 
Directorship he still continued to lecture to the course, and tailor his lectures to the 
needs of the course: ”Following the policy adopted in regard to the second course ,I 
set no examination paper ….I have therefore limited my work to the suggestion of 
methods and ideas, and have  reason to know that in the case of certain officers, 
further work on their own account has been the result”.78 By the end of the third 
course  the War Office now regarded it as part of the permanent professional training 
for selected army officers.
79
 The Army Course represented a particular triumph for 
Mackinder during his time as Director of the LSE. 
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One of the qualities that gave this course its dynamic quality was the ability of the 
lecturers and the Advisory Board to sustain a focus on the great unifying themes.  
Mackinder had this called the „great synthetic problem‟: providing a breadth of 
outlook; and increasing the power of efficiency of the British Army. One of the key 
contributions to achieving this end was the willingness and ability of academics at the 
LSE to make changes in the syllabus. In the Advisory Board report for the 1909-1910 
report the following changing were noted:”Those portions of certain subjects, eg, 
Banking, Statistics, Public Administration and Geography, which have less immediate 
practical bearing for the officers ,have been omitted ,and the time thus set free has 
been spent in amplifying the instruction in the remaining subjects, and in permitting 
the introduction of a few lectures on „Business Organization.”80  
In the course that ran from 1910 to 1911 the same process can be discerned with 
respect to Mackinder‟s lectures on Geography The regional study of Britain, and the 
geographical circumstances of opponents and allies were replaced by a completely 
new syllabus. The emphasis was still on the interpretation of Geography as a theatre 
of military operations: ”The geographical conditions will be discussed which control 
movement and supply in war. The examples will be chosen from among the following 
regions: The North–west Frontier of India, The Syrian Coastland, The Netherlands, 
The Spanish Peninsula, The Eastern Alps, The State of Virginia.”81 It is also worth 
noting that Mackinder continued to teach on this fifth course despite having to fight a 
second General Election campaign in December 1910 which saw his majority reduced 
from 434 to 26!
82
 
The army continued to be pleased with the results that the course was producing. In 
the report that was submitted in May 1911 to Haldane the following comment was 
made: ”We have much pleasure in reporting that the work of the class has been highly 
satisfactory .The class resembled last year‟s in that it was a very level one, and, if 
anything, this characteristic was more accentuated this year. The class has worked 
well and all the officers have endeavoured to make themselves thoroughly acquainted 
with the subjects”.83 There was a recognition that one of the qualities that the army  
considered important to the development of its officers was a breadth of outlook, 
despite the professional focus: ”In the search for immediate and tangible results it 
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should not be forgotten that the principal object ,which we have in view, is the 
acquirement by the officers of a good general knowledge of the subjects dealt with.”84   
In the last three Army courses that ran  from October 1911 to March 1914.there are 
both continuities and discontinuities. In terms of overall numbers the course remains 
stable, with 31,31 and 32 for these last pre-First World War years. However, the 
number of Army Service Corps officers dropped below 50 % of the course with 8, 7, 
and 10 respectively over the same period. The Army continued to be pleased with the 
results of the course, and was intent on raising the standard that was expected in the 
final exams: ”We are glad to report that the class has again been a very satisfactory 
one, all the officers working hard and taking a great interest in the subjects. 
Alterations were made this time in the character of the examination in some of the 
subjects , which had the effect of making the test more severe. The officers, however, 
all acquitted themselves with credit.”85   
In the same report that covers the period from October 1911 to March 1912 there was  
a recognition by the Advisory Board that there was a relationship between the 
continuing funding of the LSE, and the maintenance of academic standards: ”We are 
glad to note that arrangements have now been made for a three years agreement with 
the London School of Economics ,which will greatly assist the School in maintaining 
the high standard of its lecturing staff.”86                                                    
                             
 The last pre-First World War Army Class finished in March 1914, four months 
before the outbreak of hostilities. So abrupt was the termination of this course  that the 
LSE felt compelled to ask the War Office to continue certain payments, a 
consequence of the recent agreement, despite the fact that there were no longer any 
army officers available to attend the course : ”I should be glad however, if Lord 
Kitchener would take into consideration the question of the possibility of continuing 
to pay us the annual gross of £600,which under ordinary circumstances we receive 
irrespective of the fees paid for each officer attending the Army 
Class”87.Unfortunately there is no record of the War Office reply. 
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 There was a gap of one year between the Armistice in November 1918, and one of 
the academics who had been involved in the course writing to the War Office 
enquiring about its future. In a letter dated the 19 November 1919  William Beveridge 
wrote  to the War Office asking for a date when it  would be restarted. The response  
from Sir Harold Brade indicated that 1920 would be the intended date for its 
recommencement :”I find that it is not proposed to revive the course for Officers at 
the School of Economics until next October[1920]”88.   
 
The Army Class was not restarted until 1924.This raises the question as to why there  
was a gap of nearly five years between Beveridge‟s letter and the start of the next 
course? The answer to this question can be explained in the austere economic climate 
that existed between the course‟s reincarnation and its demise in 1932.The first 
insight to this is provided by a short comment in the minutes of the Army Council 
meetings for 1924.In these minutes the decision is recorded to close the School of 
Military Administration  at Chisledon and to revive the administrative course which 




A more comprehensive explanation was given in a letter that was sent by the War 
Office Secretary to the Treasury Secretary in June 1924:”The situation arising out of 
the abolition of the Army School of  Administration has been very carefully 
considered, and the Council have come to the conclusion that alternative 
arrangements must be made to the extent of providing for instruction in the principles 
of administration for selected officers who, by their promise of performance are 
marked out for higher administrative and departmental appointments. They do not 
think that any better means can be devised than to reconstitute the Officers‟ Course at 
the London School of Economics on the pre-war plan, with such modifications as 
experience suggests, and they have caused the details of a scheme for such a course to 
be examined in consultation with the authorities of the School”.90 This letter also gave 
a breakdown of the proposed costs, this was a subsidy of £1000 and a capitation fee of 
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£40 for each student, with a guarantee of not less then 25 students. It also indicated 
that the proposed start date of the course was October 1924. 
91
  
Between June and July 1924  the Treasury attempted to marshal a number of 
arguments that would mitigate against the reinstatement of the course. The first was a 
letter to the University Grants Committee which explored the argument that although 
the grant that the LSE received from the state could not be regarded as a ground for 
refusal of a War Office payment for this special course, there was a case for 
moderation in what the Government should be asked to pay through the War Office. 
This relationship between the level of the overall state grant, and the cost of the 
Mackindergarten to the War Office was articulated clearly: ”When the subject was 
last discussed with the school the Government Grant was £2,000 a year. It is now 
£16,000 and this contribution to the general expenses of the school is a handsome and 
adequate subscription to overhead charges. The London County Council, I believe, in 
return for their subsidy ,require a certain number of free places.”92   
The second argument deployed by the Treasury was much more direct .When they  
did a comparative analysis of the syllabus for the School of Military Administration 
and the Mackindergarten at the LSE they  came to the following conclusion: ”It is 
clear from this that theoretical instruction of the type proposed in the revived courses 
formed quite a small part of the curriculum at the SMA……The case for the proposal 
rests therefore, solely on the pre-war arguments The Treasury was always very 
sceptical a to the direct value of these courses to the army”.93 Furthermore, in the 
same memorandum the need for financial austerity was fused with an assertion of a 
lack of utility. The Treasury failed to comprehend or acknowledge the ability of this 
course- to facilitate and increase in the army‟s power of efficiency.:”It is on the 
departmental services that we think the present Army establishment shows signs of 
extravagance; they have not been brought down below pre–war level. In spite of the 
substantial reductions in combatant arms ….With these reductions due, it is not  time 
to invent or revive schemes for giving officers, particularly fairly senior officers 
,employment of a non-essential nature.”94  
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The final argument used by the Treasury contained a curious paradox. On one hand 
they appeared to be disparaging of the utility of the course, yet at the same time they 
acknowledged that resistance to its reinstatement was of no real financial importance 
:”I doubt whether so many officers have any real interest or enthusiasm for the 
subjects taught at the School. In as far as they that have not, a course of six months 
taken between the ages of 30 and 40 is not likely to have any lasting influence, nor to 
give value for the money spent. I have not drafted on the proposal, as there will 
undoubtedly be very strong pressure, both from the War Office and from the 
Authorities at the School of Economics to force this scheme through ,and it may be 
considered that our chance of opposing it  is not sufficient to make it worth while”.95 
The final  push was  provided by William Beveridge who had contacted the War 
office at the end of June 1924, and informed them that as the term  was coming to an 
end he needed to make provision for this course in terms of staffing. This resulted in a 
letter being send to the Treasury.
96
  The outcome was that a decision was taken to  
formally approve future funding for the course. A formal communication was sent, 
signed by Sir George Barstow on the 11
th
 July 1924, from the Treasury to the Under 
Secretary of State at the War Office:”I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of 
His Majesty‟s Treasury to request you to inform the Army Council that they sanction 
the resumption of special courses for officers at the London School of Economics on 
the terms and conditions approved”.97 Mackinder‟s course had finally made a phoenix 
like ascent back to life.            
 
    Having evaluated the reasons for the reinstatement it is intended to assess the 
syllabus of the post- First World War course  To what extent was it able to evolve in 
keeping with the original aims of the course? The best record of this period was given 
by one of officers on the first reinstated course, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Badcock: 
”The course for Army Officers is naturally a highly specialised one for in six months 
they have to do what a ordinary student for a degree has to do in three years. Like 
ancient Gaul in Caesar‟s days, our course, broadly speaking, consisted of three parts: 
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A  A regular series of lectures on some fourteen seemingly different, but in reality 
closely inter-related subjects: 
B. Some fourteen special lectures and addresses by selected people, such as Lord 
Haldane etc. 
C. Some ten “visits of observation” as they are termed, to places like the London 
Docks, the Great Western Railway works at Swindon etc.”98   
There was also evidence that   attainment levels had not been allowed to slip: “Sir 
William Beveridge informed the committee that the standard reached by students in 
the Army Class was, in the opinion of examiners who had experience of both, higher 
than that of classes before the war”99.Interestingly in this post war period there was   
evidence of what could be described as  a creative tension in terms of teaching 
pedagogy between the LSE academics and  the army. This was and is one of the 
touchstones of military education. During the same meeting the Army Director of 
Staff Duties asked Beveridge if there were not some utility in adopting the Staff 
College method of instruction in which students were divided into syndicates after the 
first three months of the course, the aim being to give them a problem to work out and 
to require them to present a joint report outlining the solution. The response was 
instructive: ”Sir William Beveridge replied that he was sympathetic to the idea of 
promoting discussions at the expense of lectures and had this already in mind, but he 
doubted whether syndicate methods lent themselves particularly to this course since 
the students had no preliminary knowledge of the subjects of which it consisted.”100 
This debate over teaching pedagogy has an echo today with respect to the United 
Kingdom‟s Defence Academy.101What was also instructive about this meeting was 
the manner in which the Standing Advisory Committee, which had replaced the pre- 
First World War Advisory Board, took an active role in the shaping the syllabus of the 
course:”The students should be encouraged to take a more active part in handling the 
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various subjects and to develop their power of expression. Less Transportation more 
Banking and the Economic Problems of War.”102 The ability of the LSE  to amend 
and modify the syllabus was underlined by the topics addressed in the B section of the 
syllabus. The Michaelmas Term of 1924 still   reflected the experimental nature of the 
syllabus of the Mackindergarten: 
 H.J.Laski   Karl Marx. 
 Baron A.Meyendorff  Russia. 
 Philip Baker  The Military Aspects of the Geneva Protocols . 
            Professor Bowley   Unemployment.  
In 1925 Mackinder ended his involvement with the course: ”In 1925 Mackinder, after 
only two years as Professor, had to retire from his London University post because of 
the age limit then in force”103. The LSE academics who continued to teach on the 
course were a remarkable collection of intellectual talent. They included: Graham 
Wallas, Harold Laski. L.C. Robbins,  Sir William Beveridge and Philip Baker. 
 
By 1931 the Geographical element of the course was being taught by Dr Dudley 
Stamp. The Army Course continued to be responsive to current developments in 
international relations. The students also had an influence in shaping this section of 
the syllabus:”The second five sessions held in the Lent term were devoted to a 
consideration of the economic geography of areas selected by the officers themselves. 
The areas included Manchuria(with special reference to the present crises),Australia 
,Argentina (with special reference to British –South American Trade)and Canada.”104 
This ability to adapt was also reflected in the other parts of the syllabus. This main 
part of the course now consisted of six areas: Economics, Political and Social Theory, 
International Relations, Transport, Geography and Law. Furthermore, the lectures 
given on the informal section of the Army Course again reflected the issues of the 
day: 
 Professor Coatman  The Present Position in India.  
 Dr Meyendorff  Modern Russia. 
 Professor Hogben American Army intelligence tests. 
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 Professor Power The Historical Background of the 
Manchurian question.  
This ability of the academics teaching on the Mackindergarten, to incorporate 
contemporary events into part of the syllabus clearly retained the focus of the original 




The Mackindergarten came to an end in 1932. However, there is evidence to suggest 
that just two years after its reinstatement, a concatenation of events began to unfold 
that created a continual resonance of uncertainty. The first was a decision by the army 
in 1926 to cut the number of students attending the course from 30 to 20.This needs to 
be balanced by the positive way in which the reinstated course was perceived by the 
army: ”The courses have proved to be of great benefit and the Council are satisfied 
that their continuance is in the best interests of the Service. At the same time some 
difficulty has been experienced in releasing as many as thirty officers annually from 
their military duties, and for this reason the Council are of the opinion that the number 
of officers to attend the course should be reduced .It is proposed therefore to limit the 
classes in future to a maximum of twenty students.”106 There was also to be a 
corresponding reduction in the money the LSE would receive.
107
   
This reduction itself, while not fatal to Mackindergarten, made it vulnerable to further 
Treasury attacks. In a letter dated 21
st
 December 1926  approval for a course to start 
in Jan 1927 was given. There was a caveat attached in terms of funding ,and the 
problems that the army had encountered in terms of the availability of officers was 
used as a weapon to question the future viability of the course: ”My Lords limit their 
approval to a period of one year as they as not satisfied that as many as twenty 
officers likely to obtain direct benefit from the courses in respect to their Army career 
will continue to be available annually .They would be glad if in the interim the Army 
council would carefully consider the further reduction or suspension of the courses, in 
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view  particular of the number of officers who have already passed through them 
since their reinstitution in 1924.”108  
The army‟s response to this was a robust defence of both the value of the course and 
the numbers of officers that were attending the LSE.:”The courses are of great value 
to the Army as a whole and while the Council fully appreciate the need for economy, 
they do not consider that any reduction in the size of the course should be made”.109   
By the late 1920s funding for the Mackindergarten  had been put on a  short term 
basis. In December 1927 the Treasury informed the War Office that it was only 
extended the end of December 1929.
110
 By this time it is clear that the pressures of 
economic austerity are beginning to bear down on War Office expenditure to the 
extent that the future existence of the Mackindergarten was put under review. Yet the 
Army Council still  defended the value of the course, while declaring the intention to 
simultaneously  make access to it more selective, and to cut the number of officers on 
the course: ”After careful consideration they are satisfied that the Army as a whole 
has derived great benefit from these courses and they are strongly of the opinion that 
they should be continued .At the same time ,in view of other pressing demands on the 
funds at their disposal, they propose to exercise an even more rigid standard of 
selection ,and to limit future courses to 16 officers (including 4 or 5 Indian Army 
officers) at a fee of 100 guineas for each officer”.111 The response of the Treasury was 
approve the funding ,but to inform the War Office that the existence of the course 
would be considered again in 1931.
112
  
The fate of the Mackindergarten was decided not on the quality of what was being 
delivered at the LSE, but by the growing global economic crisis that the British 
Government of the day was trying to cope with. In 1931 the Report of Sir George 
May‟s Committee  on National Expenditure was published.113 The army had to find  
savings of £1,690,000 from their estimates. In addition, an extra £2,000,000 of cuts 
had to be made in the Army Estimates for 1932. What was clear from the Army 
Council minutes was that in addition to a £85,000 (or 10 %) reduction in the army‟s 
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budget for education  for 1931 an extra £32,000 of cuts had to be found in 1932. It 




    There is a sense of genuine regret on behalf of the Army Council about the need to 
discontinue the Mackindergarten: ”The Council [Army] have only arrived at this 
decision with great reluctance and in view of the pressing need for economy .I am to 
express their appreciation of the arrangements that have been made by the LSE in the 
past for these courses which have in their view proved of great value, not only to the 
officers selected to attend them ,but to the Army generally.”115 
 
 The British Army had been forced to cut the provision of education for its officer 
corps in this inter-war period. It was a step that had not been forced on the American 
or the German Army despite equally severe economic challenges. However, it would 
be wrong to say that this marked the end of the Army Course at the LSE. Ten years 
later, in 1942, in the midst of the Second World War, the LSE initiated a proposal to 
revive the Army Class at the end of the conflict. Professor Harold Laski, wrote an 
initial letter to the War Office, and by March 1947 Professor Plant had formulated a 
proposed course for Transport and Other Officers
116
.The War Office took seven 
months to consider the LSE‟s offer. When it finally provided an answer it gave no 
substantial reasons for withdrawing from a course that was in a state of advanced  
preparation: ”Early in 1947 enquiries were initiated by the Directorate and discussions 
took place with Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders and Professor Plant in connection with 
the possible attendance at the LSE of a small number of RASC officers. Subsequent 
examination with the War Office has made it evident that, at least for the present, 
circumstances will not permit us to take advantage of the facilities offered. I apologise 
for our belated withdrawal from the scheme.”117 
 
It was the War Office, not the LSE, that brought the Mackindergarten to an end. The 
course had run for a total of fifteen years in a 25 year period. Evaluating the success 
of the knowledge transfer over this period of time is not easy .The evidence is 
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fragmentary. The course had a clear aims, yet it was not highly prescriptive as many  
courses in military education were and are. The final rejection of the offer by the LSE 
to restart the Army Class in 1947 underlined, it can be suggested, the absence of the 
political and personal connections that Mackinder had been able to call upon when the 
Army Class was first set up. 
  
The clearest picture of the transfer of knowledge to the tactical and operational 
environment comes from the period before and during the First World War. In 
December 1906, as soon as the course was conceived, General Kitchener, then 
Commander in Chief of India, wrote a letter from Fort William in Calcutta to Sir 
Edward Ward then Permanent Under Secretary at the War Office:”I see by the 
telegrams that the Secretary of State [Haldane] has now completed his arrangements 
for officers of the Army Service Corps going through a course of instruction at the 
LSE. As I feel sure that much of the instruction they receive there would be of the 
greatest value to Supply and Transport officers in India, I shall be very grateful if you 
would kindly arrange that any printed notes, lectures, instructions, which may be 
given to these officers, may be sent to me for the use of my officers here.”118 By 1909 
the bulk of the lectures given at the LSE, with some changes for local 
circumstances,
119





A second insight is provided by one of the erstwhile students of the course, Major 
R.B.Airey. In assessing the professional utility of the Army Course, he argued that:” 
It is rather the customs and methods of different kinds of businesses which will prove 
useful to the Army Service Corps officer in time of war. It must be remembered that 
the first and most important function of the supply officer in war is “food-finding”, 
and to be a finder of food it is invaluable to him to know the trade customs of the 
dealers in the commodities he has had to find.”121 He also evaluated the teaching of 
Economics. It was a subject that helped to foster an esprit d‟armee as opposed to an 
esprit de corps. Furthermore, it helped Army officers to think collectively: “The 
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School of Economics could teach us “the spirit of the hive”. But before we learn to 
think collectively we must learn to think at all, and of all the subjects which helped us 
to new ideas, I think the most officers would agree with me that this subject gave us 
more to think more furiously than all the rest put together.”122 His views of the 
lectures on Geography were mixed. He acknowledged the importance of this part of 
the course: “There is no need to emphasize the value of this information to the senior 
supply officers of our Army”123.Yet there can be discerned an oblique criticism of the 
emphasis in these lectures, now given by Mackinder : ”I thought that, perhaps, these 
lectures were too much strategical and too little commercial …….The lecturer 
attempted to apply his wonderful geographical knowledge to the conduct of a 
campaign and to plans of attack, subjects more suited, in my opinion to a training for 
the General Staff then for the QMG branch-but perhaps this is only the bias of the 
supply officer. Anyhow, all students at the School of Economics will agree with me 
that when the lecturer led us to the “brink of an imaginary plateau “we seemed to see 
Europe, and that we have to thank him for several interesting hours”124  Interaction 
with civilian students was seen as a positive thing: ”The atmosphere of Clare Market 
is valuable. The social intercourse with men, women and research students(almost 
sexless in their enthusiasm for lost causes and forgotten policies) ,who are all so 
different from the average soldier, is in itself widening.”125  
 
The final insight was provided by Sir Almeric Fitzroy
126
.  He made a direct 
connection between the Army Class at the LSE and the degree of logistical 
competence that was demonstrated by the British army on the Western Front.: ”He 
[Haldane] had there trained a whole school of military administrators ,whose work at 
the mobilisation and afterwards behind the French Front, had made the conduct of the 
present war such a conspicuous success at any rate, in the field of communication and 
supply.”127 These three pieces of fragmentary evidence provide an insight into the 
knowledge transfer that took place. 
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From the beginning of the war the British army faced logistical challenges in France. 
In terms of doctrine the departure point for this challenge was Field Service 
Regulations Part 2.This document was based on four principles.
128
Taken together 
this:” provided a sound if unimaginative ,underpinning for British operations.”129  As 
the scope and scale of military operations on the European continent expanded the 
British Army faced the challenge of ensuring that its logistic organisation that could 
adequately sustain these operations. Two important developments took place to 
facilitate this. The first was the expansion of the British army‟s administrative 
capability:”The successful administration of the BEF during the Great War hinged on 
the rise of the professional administrative officer. This officer was largely a product of 
the General Staff, created by the Esher and Haldane reforms of 1905-1906 and 
reinforced by the growing importance of the Staff College.”130The second 
development was more innovative. This was the use of business expertise and 
knowledge that could be adapted for the purposes of military logistics. This approach 
had been one of the „special ideas‟ of Mackinder‟s course:”In 1915 also, the BEF 
struck on its most successful innovation in administration when it  began tapping 
civilian expertise and using them at essentially the same jobs that they had done in 
Britain.”131   Civilian experts such as Sir Eric Geddes were recruited helped to change 
the military transportation system that existed in France.
132
 This in turn vastly 
improved the logistical structure and underpinned doctrinal development and 
ultimately operational effectiveness.
133
The innovation did clash with the vested 
interests of the officer corps of the army in terms of promotion and 
authority:”Business-organisers were therefore essential in the search for managerial 
improvements because of their honest portrayal of problems and the ability to 
recommend organisational solutions.”134    
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These three pieces of evidence that have been cited underscore the veracity of  the 
reports of the Advisory Board ,London School of Economics, and the Standing 
Advisory Committee in the post- First World War years. They show the course, 
through modifications to the syllabus, was able to sustain and develop the power of 
efficiency. This was one of the unique hallmarks of the Mackindergarten. 
 
In conclusion the Army Class at the London School of Economics was indeed a 
radical experiment in British military education. It was an innovation that was born 
out of the identified shortcomings of the British army‟s performance in the Boer War, 
and the subsequent desire to separate military operations from administration in a 
coherent manner. The true model for this was not the German army, although it was 
presented at the time as the source of inspiration, but the British Army of the early 
nineteenth century.
135
 The Mackindergarten can also be situated within the broad 
context of the post-1906 army reforms: ”The Haldane reforms had sought to prepare 
officers for their duties by providing them with a mixture of education and 
training”.136 The Army Class at the LSE was able to sustain its original radical core 
throughout the entire period of its existence. This point has been made previously ,but  
when it is compared with the fate of other officer training and education courses that 
were developed in the same period the contrast is striking: ”Whatever the objectives 
of the Haldane reforms, the staff at the cadet colleges who put them into practice 
insisted that conformity came before intellectual curiosity. One cadet who passed 
through Sandhurst in 1935 recorded that “Independent thinking is frowned on as 
heresy –no divergence from official view allowed.”137   
 
The Army Course at the LSE was not typical of the way in which Mackinder‟s career 
has been characterised: “Most of the causes he worked for were betrayed or came to 
nothing, and most of his farsighted warnings went unheeded”138. It successfully 
tackled the unique problem that service education has to overcome: how to cover a 
number of diverse subjects in a relative short period of time so that they contribute to 
a single end. Mackinder had outlined the solution in 1907:” Your object there (at the 
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LSE) is not merely to acquire so much knowledge, but to obtain a mastery over 
methods. It is, therefore, obviously essential that practice should go along with 
precept, that you should work problems, that you should write essays, and that you 
should criticise verbally the material that is put in front of you. Only when you have 
heard the point of view of a master of the subject, and have then attempted to handle a 
problem yourself, are you in a position to discuss with advantage the difficulties 
which arise on a nearer approach to the subject”139. 
 
The Mackindergarten in terms of its aims developed the critical link between the 
process of education, and the power of efficiency. It equipped officers with the ability 
to see the context of the situation the army had to operate in, and gave them the ability 
to meet its challenges by the simplest possible means. The Romans would have 
expressed this synthesis as „para bellum in pace‟140 It is as relevant today as when 
Haldane instructed  Mackinder to develop his „special ideas‟ in 1906. 
 
 What marked out the Mackindergarten, in terms of military education, was the ability 
to solve the „great synthetic problem‟.141The realisation that this approach, if based on 
a breadth of outlook, could bring a special kind of knowledge to bear The Army 
Course between 1907 and 1914, and from 1924 to 1932 fulfilled these aims in a way 
that was unique. Yet it was not divorced from the challenges that education as a whole 
faces :”Knowledge is an honorific title we confer on our paradigm cognitive 
achievements, which is why there is an important question about the nature of 
knowledge. As an important honorific term,‟knowledge‟ is bound to be 
contested….knowledge is not just a factual state or condition but a particular 
normative status”.142  .  
 
 Mackinder was not alone in recognising that the mere comprehension of new facts 
was not enough. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, when highlighting the deficient 
aspects of naval education, claimed that :”We acquire some knowledge of facts about 
guns,ships, and other concrete subjects, but we are not trained to reason ,nor are we 
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taught anything about the conduct of war.
143” However, the Class for the 
Administrative Training of Army Officers was one of the few occasions in the 
twentieth century when a multi-disciplined, yet coherent course, was developed and 
taught by university academics that satisfied the criteria of what a fighting 
organisation required. This was a rare legacy indeed. 
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